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I. INTRODUCTION
A body of statutory law known as workers' compensation arose with the
industrial growth of the United States in the early part of the twentieth century. As
the law of negligence between master and servant proved grossly inadequate to
recompense the many injuries and deaths occurring in the rapidly expanding industrial
society, legislatures across the nation responded with workers' compensation acts
designed to compensate for work-related injuries.' The workers' compensation
system holds employers liable for employees' work-related injuries regardless of the
degree of employer or employee fault. Victims of work-related injuries receive
financial and medical benefits and avoid becoming wards of the state. Employers add
the cost of the compensation plan to the total cost of their products; thus, the cost of
the injury is allocated to the consumer. 2 Legislators decided that "the cost of the
product should bear the blood of the workman.' 3
Workers' compensation, in sharp contrast to negligence concepts, must be paid
regardless of who, if anyone, is at fault.4 In Ohio, and in most states, a worker is
entitled to compensation if the employee's injury was incurred "in the course of his
employment and [arose] out of [his or her] employment." 5 Workers' compensation
becomes an employee's exclusive remedy for recovery. The Act insulates the
employer from liability for common law torts.6 The benefits granted to the injured
employee help mitigate the effects of the employee's injury; the employee is
compensated for lost income caused by the injury and medical expenses.7 The injured
employee and his or her dependents are entitled to benefits only if the statutory
eligibility requirements are met. 8 The benefits are paid from a state insurance fund to
which employers pay periodic premiums. The amount paid by an employer is based
on the degree of hazard of the employer's particular business; employers, however,
can elect to become self-insurers and pay benefits directly to injured employees
instead of contributing premiums to the state insurance fund. 9 A determination of
work-relatedness, not the degree of fault of the employer or employee, is critical to
a claim for compensation. 10 "[T]he test is not the relation of an individual's personal
quality (fault) to an event, but the relationship of an event to an employment. The
I. N. WHITE & N. DosKER, OHIO MANUAL OF CoMPENsAIoN LAw V-VII(ann. 1920).
2. I A. LARSON, VORKMEN'S COMPENSAION §§ 1.20, 2.20 (1984).
3. W. PROSSER & W. KEEroN, LAw OF TORTS § 80, at 573 (5th ed. 1984).
4. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2. § 2.10.
5. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page Supp. 1983).
6. Id. § 4123.74 (Page 1980). But see Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984);
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc.. 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) (Ohio Rev. Code §
4123.74 does not preclude an employee from bringing an action against his employer for an intentional tort.).
7. J. YOUNG, VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF OHIO § 1.14 (2d cd. 1971).
8. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.69 (Page 1980).
9. See id. §§ 4123.29, 4123.35 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1983).
10. 1 A. LARsoN, supra note 2, § 2.10.
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essence of applying the test is not a matter of assessing blame, but of marking out
boundaries."" The difficulty lies in defining those boundaries.
In August 1983, the Ohio Supreme Court establisheda new course in identifying
work-connected injuries. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co. ' 2 marked a substantial turning
point in Ohio workers' compensation law. An employee who was injured while
returning to work from lunch was permitted to recover workers' compensation
because his injury stemmed from a special risk emanating from his employment; this
recovery precluded application of the general going and coming rule-a rule which
denies compensation for injuries arising from accidents that occur while the employee
is on the way to or from work.' 3 Littlefield is significant not only because of the
context in which the accident occurred but also because of the policy ramifications
underlying the decision. Individual workers will no longer bear the risk of certain
travel-related injuries; instead, these costs will be allocated to the general consuming
public. 14
Littlefield distorts the application of the policies of the Ohio workers' compen-
sation system and alters the method by which courts will determine whether an injury
is work-related for workers' compensation cases. This Comment identifies and
discusses the factual circumstances that warrant an application of the special risk
exception as adopted in Littlefield. An understanding of those situations is crucial to
formulate a workable rule for courts and practitioners. By viewing the special risk
exception to the general going and coming rule as merely another means to arrive at
a determination of work-connection-whether an injury occurred "in the course of"
employment-the effects of Littlefield can be understood.
II. THE SPECIAL RISK ExCEPTION TO THE GOING AND COMING RULE
A. Statutory Requirements and the Distinction from Tort Law
Any discussion of work-connected injuries must begin with the general statutory
mandate that an injury must occur in the "course of, and [must] arisfe] out of, the
injured employee's employment to be compensable.' 1 5 Ohio, as well as a majority
of states, has adopted these deceptively simple words as the coverage formula for
workers' compensation. 16 The difficulty in applying this general and vague test to a
real set of facts and circumstances accounts for the discrepancies in the court decisions
that have discussed the test.
The few and seemingly simple words "arising out of and in the course of employment"
have been the fruitful (or fruitless) source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice
distinctions and supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in
11. Id.
12. 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 453 N.E.2d 570 (1983).
13. For an interesting comparison, see Hawkins v. Connor, No. 10-82-11 (Mercer County Ct. App. Aug. 12,
1983), a case decided two weeks before Littlefield on substantially similar facts, in which the court concluded that the
employee could not recover compensation.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 207-10.
15. OHfo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page Supp. 1983).
16. See I A. LARsoN, supra note 2, § 6.10.
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a maze of confusion. From their number, counsel can, in most cases, cite whatever seems
to be an authority for resolving in his favor, on whichever side he may be, the question
in dispute.' 7
Perhaps much of the confusion arising from the application of the statutory test
involves a misunderstanding of the purposes served by the two components of the test:
(1) arising out of the employment and (2) in the course of employment. "Arising out
of employment" has been defined as the causal relationship between the injury and
the employment.' 8 For an injured employee to recover compensation, a direct causal
connection must exist between the employment and the injury. ' 9 Ohio courts, when
determining whether the initiating cause of an injury was a hazard of the employment,
thus meeting the causal connection requirement, have examined the circumstances of
each case to determine whether the employee was subjected to any greater hazard than
was a member of the general public. 20 Larson has identified this as the increased-risk
test; a court that uses this test examines the frequency with which the employee
encounters the risk, even though the risk may nevertheless be common to the general
public. 2' The increased risk test is applied by a majority of states when determining
whether the "arising out of" requirement has been met. 22
The second component of the statutory test requires that the injury be received
in the "course of employment." "In the course of employment" has been defined as
the status of performing duties on behalf of the employer.2 3 This inquiry focuses on
the employee's activity at the time of the injury, rather than the causal connection
between the injury and the employment. 24 The course-of-employment inquiry into
work connection examines the time and place of the injury. If the employee's activity
at the time the injury was inflicted was related to his employment, the injury occurred
in the course of employment.2
The statutory test thus may be subdivided into its two component parts: causal
connection and work connection. The legislature must have intended that both parts
of the test be satisfied in order for an injured worker to merit compensation. While
courts have adopted tests to aid in applying the statutory mandate, they do not
distinguish which component, arising out of or in the course of, they actually have
addressed. The going and coming rule was adopted to aid in the determination of work
connection, because an employee's activity when traveling to and from work is
usually a personal risk and only indirectly related to the employment. 26 The special
17. 2 W. HANNA, CAuFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 8.0212][a](2d ed. 1980).
18. J. YOUNG, supra note 7, §§ 5.3, 5.12. See generally Johnson, Workmen's Compensation, 38 LA. L. REV. 483
(1973). The Ohio Constitution contains only the "course of employment" requirement. Onto CoNsT. art. II, § 35. The
"arising out of employment" component of the test emerged in Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner, 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E.
104 (1917), was adopted by the legislature in 1937, and is codified at Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page Supp.
1983). See J. YOUNG, supra note 7, § 5.12.
19. J. YOUNG, supra note 7, § 5.3.
20. Id.
21. 1 A. LARsoN, supra note 2, § 6.30.
22. Id.
23. J. YOUNG, supra note 7, § 5.3.
24. Id.
25. 1 A. LAN oN, supra note 2, § 14.00.
26. J. YOUNG, supra note 7, § 5.7.
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risk exception adopted by the court in Littlefield2 7 was applied as an exception to the
going and coming rule. Thus, it seems that the court should have examined the work
connection of Littlefield's injury. The court, however, focused on the existence or
nonexistence of a special risk that is "distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater
than risks common to the public," 28 an examination into the causal connection
between the injury and the employment. Specifically, an inquiry into whether a risk
was quantitatively greater than a common risk restates the increased-risk doctrine
used in "arising out of" analyses. 2 9 An inquiry into whether the risk was distinctive
in nature, appears to be a resurrection of the criticized peculiar-risk doctrine, used in
the early application of the "arising out of" test. 30
The application of the two-part statutory test has been far from conceptually
pure. 3' Because the court has not provided clear guidance for a well-reasoned
analysis, the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to determine
whether an injury is compensable. The best guidance comes from comparing and
contrasting the facts of prior cases with the facts of a current case. A mere incantation
of the words "distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater" risk is not sufficient. A
determination of whether an injury was received in the "course of and arising out of"
employment can be resolved only by examining all of the facts and circumstances
relevant to both causal connection and work connection. Larson has indicated that
courts actually apply a quantum theory of work connection, whereby a strong
causation factor may offset a weak work connection factor and a weak causation
factor may be offset by a strong work connection factor. 32 The application of the
Littlefield special risk exception should be resolved in a similar manner: by examining
and weighing the facts related to both causation and work-connection. 33
In part, the confusion over the interpretation of these words also stems from the
application of tort concepts to workers' compensation. 34 Again, however, the degree
of work-connection, not the degree of fault, differentiates workers' compensation and
tort law. 35 When applying principles of work-connection, tort law causation concepts,
such as proximate and legal cause, must not be introduced into the analysis:
[P]roximate cause or legal cause is out of place in compensation law because, as developed
in tort law, it is a concept that is itself thoroughly suffused with the idea of fault; that is,
it is a theory of causation designed to bring about a just result when starting from an act
containing some element of fault.36
27. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
28. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 453 N.E.2d 570 (1983).
29. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 6.30.
30. See id. § 6.20.
31. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 29.10; Malone, The Limits of Coverage In Workmen's Compensation-Tle
Dual Requirement Reappraised, 51 N.C.L. REV. 705 (1973); Note, Workmen's Compensation-"injury .. .Received
in tire Course of, and Arising Out of, tire injured Employee's Employment," 30 U. CIN. L. REV. 498 (1961).
32. IA A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 29.10.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 97-206.
34. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 17, § 8.02[21[b]; see also Larson, Tire Legal Aspects of Causation In Workmen's
Compensation, 8 RtrroERS L. REV. 423 (1954).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
36. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 6.60.
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Workers' compensation and therefore a test of work-connection should not
require that an injury was foreseeable or that an injury was proximately caused by an
employment risk. Hence, in the famous case of Palsgraff v. Long Island R.R. ,37 if
resulting from her employment, Mrs. Palsgraff's injuries from the explosion at the
railroad station would have been compensable if they were incurred in the course of
and arose out of her employment.
B. The Going and Coming Rule
To aid in interpreting "arising out of and in the course of employment," courts
in Ohio and elsewhere have developed the going and coming rule in cases in which
employees were traveling to and from work. In general, the going and coming rule
provides that when employees who have a fixed situs of employment incur injuries
while going to or coming from work, the injuries are not compensable. 38 Courts
reason that the relationship between the employer and the employee ceases when the
employee is traveling to and from work; during this travel time, the employee, in
relation to the employer, is simply another member of the general public. 39 This
judicially created rule of thumb separates business activities from personal activities.
Injuries that occur while engaged in personal activities are not compensable. 40
Previously, courts easily applied the rule by relying on the physical property line of
the employer's facility to distinguish when an employee is traveling to or from work
and when the employee has resumed the course of his employment. 4' An accident that
occurred on the employer's premises was work-connected and thus compensable, but
an accident that occurred off the premises was not. As a general proposition, an
application of the rule produces just results in a broad range of cases, since most
employees commuting to and from work or driving to and from lunch are not in the
course of their employment. However, courts have had difficulty resolving cases that
merit compensation but that, because the accident occurred off of the employer's
premises, are precluded from coverage by the going and coming rule.
Courts have liberally applied exceptions to the judicially created going and
coming rule, thus avoiding harsh results in compelling cases without entirely abro-
gating the general rule. 42 Among the exceptions are the special mission exception, 43
37. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
38. Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 303-04,401 N.E.2d 448,450 (1980); Industrial Comm'n v. Gintert,
128 Ohio St. 129, 190 N.E. 400 (1934); Industrial Comm'n v. Heil, 123 Ohio St. 604, 176 N.E. 458 (1931); 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 2, § 15.00; J. YOUNo, supra note 7, § 5.7.
39. 8 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKtEN'S COMPENSATION § 1710 (3d ed. 1951).
40. J. YOuNo, supra note 7, § 5.7.
41. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.11.
42. S. HORovnz, HOROVfTZ ON WORtEN S COMPENsAnON 162 (1944); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.12; 8 W.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 39, § 1712; Cooper, The "'Operating Premises" Exception To The Going and Coming Rule, 59
Ky. LJ. 145 (1970); Davis, Workmen's Compensation in Connecticut-The Necessary Work Connection, 7 CONN. L.
REv. 199 (1974-75); Note, Workmen's Compensation-Compensation For Off-Premises Work Break Injury-Pacheco v.
Orchids of Hawaii, 14 B.C. INDUS AND CO.. L. REv. 1104 (1972-73); Note, Workers' Compensation In Iowa-The Going
And Coming Rule And Its Exceptions, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 688 (1977-78); Note, The Going and Coming Rule, 41 NOTRE
DAmE L. 185 (1965); Note, IVorkmen's Compensation-The "Going And Coming" Rule And Its Exceptions In Kentucky,
47 KY. L.J. 420 (1959); Comment, Workmen's Compensation: The "Going and Coining Rule" and its Exceptions in
Arkansas, 21 ARK. L. REV. 414 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Workmen's Compensation]; Case Comment,
Workmen's Compensation-Going and Coming Rule-Applicability of Close Proximity Exception to Lunch Hour Injuries,
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the close proximity exception, 44 the sole ingress and egress exception, 45 the travel in
furtherance of an employer's business exception, 46 and the special hazard excep-
tion.47 These exceptions to the general rule were created to compensate employees
when they were acting in the course of their employer's business even though they
were traveling to or from work. Often these exceptions are applied in situations that
warrant compensation when the general rule would otherwise preclude it. If the
exceptions are viewed as identifications of cases in which an ordinarily noncom-
pensable activity actually occurs in the course of employment, 48 an analysis of the
problem becomes simpler. While the exceptions narrow the scope of the general going
and coming rule, they become important not because their use avoids the rule but
because they define circumstances in which the finding of work-connection is based
on the facts of individual cases.
C. The Special Risk Exception
When an employment relationship creates a special risk, the special hazard or
risk exception applies. Injuries that occur within the scope of that risk are compen-
sable. 49 Frequently, special risks are associated with hazards that affect the sole
means of ingress or egress to the employer's premises. 50 The United States Supreme
Court has validated the use of the special risk exception to compensate off-premises
injuries, when the hazard endangered either the only means of access to the
employer's premises or the most convenient means of access to the employer's
premises. 5' Employment hazards often extend beyond premises lines and create risks
of employment. 52 However, to be compensable the injury must have actually resulted
from the special hazard emanating from the employment premises; an accident due to
a nonemployment condition should not be compensable merely because a special risk
47 IowA L. REv. 1174 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Case Comment, Going and Coming Rule]; Case Comment, Workmen's
Compensation-Injuries Sustained by Employee While Going to and from Work, 36 N.C.L. REv. 367 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Case Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Injuries].
43. See generally General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr.
417 (1976); Schreifer v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 289, 391 P.2d 832, 38 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964); Perez
v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 152 Cal. App. 3d 60, 199 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1984); 2 W. HANNA, supra note
17, § 9.03[3][c][iv]; I A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 16.10.
44. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.12; 8 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 39, § 1724; Comment, Vorkmen's
Compensation, supra note 28; Case Comment, Going and Coming Rule, supra note 28.
45. See 8 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 38, §§ 1725-173 1; Comment, The Going and Coming Rule and Article 8309,
Section lb, 22 S. L.J. 841 (1968); Case Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Injuries, supra note 28.
46. See 2 W. HANNA, supra note 17, § 9.03[ 11]; 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2. §§ 16.20, 16.30; 8 W. SCHNEIDER, supra
note 39, § 1736.
47. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 15.13, 15.31; Tobiason, Peculiar Risk: Going or Coming?, 14 IDAHO L.
REV. 739 (1978); see also infra text accompanying notes 49-56.
48. See 2 W. HANNA, supra note 17, § 9.03[31[b1, [c].
49. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 391, 453 N.E.2d 570, 573 (1983).
50. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.13.
51. Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923).
In both cases, the Court held that railroad crossings near the ingress and egress to the employer's premises were hazards
of the employment, even though the crossings were not on the employer's premises. See also I A. LARSON, supra note
2, § 15.13.
52. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.31.
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not located on the premises exists.5 3 The injury must be "in the course of and arising
out of" the employment.
While Ohio courts prior to Littlefield had not articulated the special risk
exception, 54 California courts had applied the exception to situations when the
employee had entered either the employer's premises or the means of access to the
premises, even if the employer had no control over the entrance. 55 The special hazard
exception, as adopted in Ohio, does not abrogate the going and coming rule but
merely provides an additional avenue to avoid the rule's application. 56 Since the
special risk exception operates as another method to determine whether a particular
injury occurred in the course of employment, the factual circumstances of the accident
become critical to an analysis of work-connection.
III. THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF LITTLEFELD V. PILLSBURY Co.
On August 10, 1977, Ronald Littlefield, a grain operator, left work at the
Pillsbury Company to go to a nearby local restaurant for lunch. Since Littlefield was
required to work during his usual paid fifteen minute break, he added fifteen minutes
to his otherwise unpaid thirty minute lunch. 57 Food was unavailable at the plant, and
Pillsbury occasionally paid for employees' meals at the restaurant at which Littlefield
ate the day he was injured. The employer chose this restaurant to occasionally provide
meals for its employees because the restaurant was near the plant.5 8
On the return to the plant, the driver of the car in which Littlefield was a
passenger stopped the car on the highway and waited to make a left-hand turn into the
sole plant entrance. While stopped, the car was struck from behind by a grain truck.
Littlefield was severely injured; quadriplegia resulted.5 9 Littlefield sought workers'
compensation benefits for his injuries but was denied any award at the district and
regional levels. The Industrial Commission refused to hear his appeal. On appeal to
the court of common pleas, it was held that Littlefield's injuries occurred "in the
course of and [arose] out of his employment.' 6 The court of appeals reversed the
common pleas court's holding for lack of causal connection between Littlefield's
injuries and his employment. 6'
The Ohio Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, reversed the court of
appeals and held that Littlefield's injuries were compensable even though they were
53. Id.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 63-64.
55. See, e.g., Parks v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 585, 589, 660 P.2d 382, 384, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158,
160 (1983).
56. For an illustration of the court's tendency to qualify overly-broad pronouncements of law, compare Haverlack
v. Portage Homes, Inc.. 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982) (eliminating municipal tort immunity) with later
decisions applying immunity to a municipal corporation's actions involving the exercise of a legislative or judicial
function, or an executive or planning function involving a high degree of official discretion. This phenomenon was noted
in Porter & Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 Oto ST. L.J. 143,
152 n.72 (1984).
57. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 389, 453 N.E.2d 570, 571-72 (1983).
58. Id. at 389-90, 453 N.E.2d at 572.
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sustained while Littlefield was not on the employer's premises and were incurred
during Littlefield's lunch hour.62 Although the going and coming rule generally
obviates a recovery by an employee injured while traveling to and from a fixed and
limited place of employment, the Littlefield court recognized the special hazard or risk
exception in an effort to circumvent application of the general rule when the
employment creates special risks that extend beyond the employer's premises line.63
Although Ohio had not expressly adopted the special risk exception prior to Little-
field,64 the court noted a number of other jurisdictions which recognize the exception
when presented with facts similar to Littlefield.65
The court particularly emphasized the 1932 case of Industrial Commission v.
Henry.66 In Henry, the employee left his employer's premises to eat breakfast. The
employer acquiesced in this practice, because by eating a later breakfast, the
employees could more efficiently deliver the employer's milk. Upon returning to the
workplace, the worker was struck and killed by an oncoming train at a railroad
crossing immediately adjacent to the employer's premises. 67 Since the employee had
to cross the railroad tracks to reach the sole entrance to his employment, the Henry
court found the railroad crossing to be an extension of the employer's premises. 68 The
court awarded compensation.
The Littlefield court used logic similar to that used by the Henry court to find that
the employee's lunch benefitted his employer. 69 The Littlefield court noted several
similarities to Henry. First, in both cases, the restaurant was near the employer's
premises. 70 Second, the return trip to the plant from the restaurant did not deviate. 7'
Finally, the court found significant Pillsbury's history of occasionally paying for
employees' beverages and food at the restaurant. 72 The court deemed these similar-
62. Id. at 390, 453 N.E.2d at 572.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 392, 453 N.E.2d at 574. The court cited several Ohio cases that had impliedly recognized the special risk
exception. See, e.g., Marlow v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 18, 225 N.E.2d 241 (1967); Sebek v.
Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., 148 Ohio St. 693, 76 N.E.2d 892 (1947); Gregory v. Industrial Comm'n. 129 Ohio St.
365, 195 N.E. 699 (1935); Kasari v. Industrial Comm'n, 125 Ohio St. 410, 181 N.E. 809 (1932); Industrial Comm'n v.
Henry, 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194 (1932).
65. See Greydanus v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 490,407 P.2d 296, 47 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1965); Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170 P.2d 18 (1946); Oliver v. Wyandotte Indus. Corp.. 308
A.2d 860 (Me. 1973); Husted v. Seneca Steel Serv., Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 140, 359 N.E.2d 673, 391 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1976).
66. 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194 (1932).
67. Id. at 617-18, 621, 180 N.E. at 195-96.
68. Id. at 621-22, 180 N.E. at 196.
69. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394-95, 453 N.E.2d 570, 576 (1983). See Justice Locher's
dissent to Littlefield for a criticism of the "benefit to qmployer" argument. Id. at 403, 453 N.E.2d at 582; see also infra
text accompanying notes 190-205.
70. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394, 453 N.E.2d 570, 575 (1983). However, the proximity of
the accident to the premises is the critical factor, not necessarily the proximity of the ultimate destination of the employee's
personal trip. See infra text accompanying notes 107-52.
71. The lack of deviation, however, is relevant only to travel that furthers the employer's business, not to personal
travel. See I A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 19.00.
72. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394, 453 N.E.2d 570, 575-76 (1983). Because the employer
occasionally financed the lunches, it appears that the employer acquiesced in the lunch breaks, an issue certainly not in




ities with Henry important in its analysis that executing a left-hand turn into
Pillsbury's premises related to Littlefield's employment. 73
The Littlefield court adopted the two-prong test used by the California Supreme
Court in General Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board74 to
determine when the special hazard rule applies. The General Insurance test provides
that the special hazard rule applies "(1) if 'but for' the employment, the employee
would not have been at the location when the injury occurred and (2) if the risk is
distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater than risks common to the public.' '75
Applying this test to Littlefield, the court found that Littlefield would not have been
making a left turn into the plant but for his employment. The first element of the test
was thus satisfied. In addition, the regular exposure to the common risk of traveling
on and turning left from a busy road adjacent to his place of employment involved a
greater degree of risk for Littlefield than for the general public. The court found that
this satisfied the second requirement of the special risk test. Consequently, both a
special risk and a connection between Littlefield's work and his injury existed. 76
Three justices, in a sharp dissenting opinion, criticized the Littlefield majority's
reliance on case law from other jurisdictions and distinguished the Ohio precedent on
which the majority relied. 77 The dissenting opinion noted that compensated injuries
in previous Ohio cases occurred on the employer's premises, a factor noticeably
absent in Littlefield.78 Carried to its logical extension, the special hazard test
enunciated by the court was criticized as extending workers' compensation coverage
to all accidents, whether employment-related or not. According to the dissenting
justices, the "but for" standard employed by the majority had historically been used
to shield defendants from tort liability rather than to establish liability. 79 Additionally,
the dissenters noted that the correct standard for determining work connection is the
existence of a proximate causal relationship between the employment and the injury
not the "but for" test.80
IV. FACTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIAL RISK EXCEPTION
A. The "But For" Test
If the employee would not have been at the place where the injury occurred "but
for" his employment the first prong of the Littlefield test is satisfied.8' In Littlefield,
the court found that but for his employment, Littlefield would not have been making
73. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394-95, 453 N.E.2d 570, 576 (1983).
74. 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
75. Id. at 601, 546 P.2d at 1364, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
76. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394, 453 N.E.2d 570, 575 (1983).
77. Id. at 396-404. 453 N.E.2d at 577-83 (Locher, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 399-401, 453 N.E.2d at 579-80.
79. Id. at 397, 453 N.E.2d at 578.
80. Id. at 397-98, 453 N.E.2d at 578 (citing McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 152 Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 138
(1949)). By noting that work connection requires a proximate, causal relationship, the dissenters appear to have deemed
both "in the course of" and "arising out of" necessary requirements.
81. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394, 453 N.E.2d 570, 575 (1983).
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a left-hand turn into the employer's premises. 82 Similarly, in Parks v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board,83 Sandra Parks, a teacher, had left the school parking
lot and was driving home on a public street when she was injured. While Parks' car
and several other cars were stopped in front of the school waiting for a group of
schoolchildren to cross the road, three youths opened Parks' car door and stole her
purse. 84 The court held that Parks would not have been injured "but for" her
employment. The problem with this finding, however, is the potential extension of the
"but for" rationale; if Parks were assaulted in her driveway while returning home
from work, the same result could follow: "but for" her employment, she would not
have been in the driveway at that particular moment. Likewise, if she had slipped in
the bathtub while getting ready to go to school, the "but for" test would be met;85
but for her employment, Parks would have remained in bed and would not have been
in the shower.
In General Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board86 an
employee's death was found to be causally related to his employment, since "but for"
his job, he would not have been killed. The deceased employee, Chairez, had left for
work early one morning. When he stepped out of his car, which was parked on the
street in front of the employer's premises, he was struck by a passing car and killed.87
The court found the employee's death causally related to his employment. Compen-
sation was denied, however, because the court concluded that his death did not arise
out of a distinctive or quantitatively greater risk than that encountered by the public. 88
The General Insurance court, the progenitor of the two-prong test, seemed to use
the "but for" test as a threshold requirement to recover under the exception created
by a special risk-a test of legal causation. 89 This causal relationship has no relation
to the existence of a special risk to the employee. 90 Hence, the Littlefield dissenting
justices correctly labeled the "but for" test a device used to exclude defendants from
liability rather than as one to establish it.91
[A]t most [the but for test] must be a rule of exclusion: if the event would not have
occurred "but for" the defendant's negligence, it still does not follow that there is
liability, since other considerations ... may prevent it. It should be quite obvious that,
once events are set in motion, there is, in terms of causation alone, no place to stop. 92
Professor Larson identifies the "but for" test as the positional risk test to
determine whether the injury "arises out of the employment' '-an inquiry into causal
82. Id.
83. 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983).
84. Id. at 587, 660 P.2d at 383, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
85. See Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 397, 453 N.E.2d 570, 577 (1983) (Locher, J., dissenting),
where Justice Locher made this argument.
86. 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
87. Id. at 598, 546 P.2d at 1362, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
88. Id. at 601, 546 P.2d at 1346, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
89. Id.
90. Id. The "but for" test can perhaps be characterized as the test to determine whether the "arising out of"
requirement has been met.
91. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 397, 453 N.E.2d 570, 578 (1983) (Locher, J., dissenting).
92. W. PRossts & W. KEETON, supra note 3, § 41, at 266.
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connection. 93 However, in cases when the going and coming rule applies, causation
is rarely a problem; courts usually find that the injury arose out of the employment. 94
The critical issue in going and coming rule cases is whether the injury occurred in the
"course of employment"-a time and place factual inquiry. 95 The use of the "but
for" test in applying the special risk exception seems to be a harmless exercise, as
long as it is not confused with a determination of whether the injury was received in
the course of the employee's employment. While the "but for" test is concerned with
causal connection, which is usually not at issue in Littlefield-type cases, the "nature
or greater risk"96 test is a purely factual inquiry into work-connection, not work
causation.
B. The "Distinctive in Nature or Quantitatively Greater Risk" Test
The second prong of the General Insurance test requires the risk to be "dis-
tinctive in nature or quantitatively greater than risks common to the public.'"97 The
Littlefield court found that regular exposure to the risk of driving on a busy highway
and to the added risk of making a left-hand turn magnified the common risk to the
worker; thus, the General Insurance test's second prong was met, justifying appli-
cation of the special hazard exception.98 A risk that is distinctive in nature or
quantitatively greater than a common risk, however, is difficult to define. In
Littlefield, because the employee executed the left turn into the employer's premises
each day, the common risk became quantitatively greater; by contrast, in General
Insurance, parking on a busy street that was adjacent to the employer's premises was
not a risk to which the rule applied. 99
The two-pronged test should be applied on an ad hoc basis, and not as a
mechanical formula. The facts and circumstances of an accident must be compared
with the facts and circumstances of similar cases to determine whether an injury has
occurred in the course of employment. The Ohio work-connection test requires the
existence of a direct or indirect connection between the injury and the activities,
conditions, or environments of the employment. 100 In reality, the special hazards test
requires only a determination of work connection that is similar to many other
exceptions to the general going and coming rule. ' 0' Since the course of employment
analysis is widely recognized as an inquiry into the facts surrounding an accident,10 2
a court applying the second prong of the special hazard test should examine the factual
circumstances of other, related cases.
93. 1 A. LARSoN, supra note 2, §§ 15.00, 14.00; see supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
94. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.15.
95. Id.
96. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394, 453 N.E.2d 570, 575 (1983).
97. General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.. 16 Cal. 3d 595, 601, 546 P.2d 1361, 1364. 128 Cal. Rptr.
417, 420 (1976); see also Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394, 453 N.E.2d 570, 575 (1983).
98. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394, 453 N.E.2d 570. 575 (1983).
99. General Ins. Co. v. Workers'Comp. Appeals Bd.. 16 Cal. 3d 595, 601,546 P.2d 1361, 1364, 128 Cal. Rptr.
417, 420 (1976).
100. Industrial Comm'n v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. I, 130 N.E. 38 (1921).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
102. See I A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 14.00; J. YouNo, supra note 7, § 5.3.
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Generally, fact patterns in special risk cases come within one of four categories
in which work-connection can be analyzed: (1) the proximity of the accident to the
employer's premises, 0 3 (2) the employer's control over the location of the acci-
dent, 0 4 (3) the instrumentality or person physically affecting the accident,10 5 and (4)
the benefit to the employer from the employee's activity at the time of the accident. 0 6
Each of these categories is examined below.
1. The Proximity of the Accident to the Employer's Premises
Ohio recognizes that injuries that occur on the employer's premises are prima
facie within the course of employment. 10 7 Accidents that occur after the worker
physically enters the employer's property, even though he is technically not yet at
work, are considered to result from hazards of the employment. 0 8 The premises rule
has been a fairly objective standard by which to decide going and coming rule
cases. ' 0 9 However, problems arise with accidents that occur adjacent to, but on the
other, nonemployer owned, side of the premises line. "10 Often, a work-related injury
which should be compensated occurs when the employee is not physically on the
employer's premises. Arguably, an exception to or extension of the general rule is
necessary. However, if compensation is awarded in cases when the accident occurs
a few feet farther from the premises line each time, a case-by-case encroachment of
the general rule results. I  A standard less concrete than the premises line also
decreases the predictability of a rule to determine when workers' compensation
should be awarded.
California law permits a person to be compensated for an injury if it occurs
within a reasonable margin of time and space from the employment. 112 This approach
circumvents the application of the mechanical premises standard. In Pacific Indemnity
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 113 an employee's car was struck when only
half of it was in his employer's parking lot. The court held that the employee's injuries
were compensable even though the accident did not occur entirely on the premises;
"borderline cases" are within a "reasonable margin of time and space" from the
premises. "14
103. Industrial Comm'n v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. I, 130 N.E. 38 (1921).
104. Id.
105. This category has not been expressly recognized, but plays a part in "course of employment" analyses. See
infra text accompanying notes 171-89.
106. Industrial Comm'n v. Weigandt. 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38 (1921); see Lord v. Daugherty, 66 Ohio St. 2d
441, 423 N.E.2d 96 (1981); Industrial Comm'n v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. 129, 190 N.E. 400 (1934).
107. J. YOUNG, supra note 7, § 5.8.
108. Kasari v. Industrial Comm'n, 125 Ohio St. 410, 181 N.E. 809 (1932).
109. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.11.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 15.12; see, e.g., Levine v. Haddon Hall Hotel, 66 N.J. 415, 332 A.2d 193 (1975); Hornyak v. Great A.
& P. Tea Co., 63 N.J. 99, 305 A.2d 65 (1973).
112. See, e.g., Parks v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983);
General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976); Greydanus
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 490, 407 P.2d 296, 47 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1965).
113. 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170 P.2d 18 (1946).
114. Id. at 336, 170 P.2d at 22.
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The distance between an accident and the employer's premises was extended
further in Greydanus v. Industrial Accident Commission."15 In Greydanus, an
employee's car was struck a few feet from his employer's premises while the
employee was turning left from a highway. The court affirmed the commission's
finding that the employee was injured in the course of his employment. The court
relied on a reasonableness standard in determining whether the accident occurred "on
the employer's premises." 116 Critics argue that the "reasonable distance" analysis
abrogates the premises rule by extending the premises line a few feet at a time,
without providing a workable analysis for close cases. "17
Ohio has not adopted the reasonable distance theory; instead, Ohio courts have
employed a "zone of employment" rule; injuries that occur within the zone of
employment are compensable. "18 In Marlow v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. , 19 the
Ohio Supreme Court articulated the zone of employment rule. While Marlow was
driving his car out of a parking garage owned and maintained by the employer, he was
hit by another car and was injured.' 20 The court held that an employee does not
necessarily need to be engaged in some specific duty of employment at the time of
the accident, nor does the risk need to be peculiar to his employment in order to be
compensated for his injuries; so long as the employee is injured in the zone of his
employment, he is eligible to receive workers' compensation. 121 Similarly, in Kasari
v. Industrial Commission,122 the court upheld the award of compensation to the
widow of an employee who was killed when entering his employer's premises:
"Traversing the zone between the entrance of the employer's premises and the plant
where an employee is employed, is one of the hazards of the employment."'' 23 Until
Littlefield, however, no Ohio court had extended the zone of employment to areas not
on the employer's premises, unless the employee had already reached his employer's
parking lot and was crossing the highway to his workplace.
In Littlefield, Littlefield was injured on a public highway immediately adjacent
to his employer's premises. 124 Like the hazard presented by Industrial Commission v.
Hemy,,' 25 the employment hazard extended just beyond the employer's premises. In
both cases, the court awarded the plaintiffs compensation for the injuries. The
problem with these cases is the seemingly unbounded limitation of the general going
and coming rule. Without applying the objective limit of the premises line, the
extension of employment hazards appears to be limitless. In addition it complicates
the predictability of the general rule. As noted in the Littlefield dissent, Justice
115. 63 Cal. 2d 490, 407 P.2d 296, 47 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1965).
116. Id. at 492, 407 P.2d at 298, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
117. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2. § 15.12. Contra S. HoRovnz, supra note 42, at 159-62.
118. Marlow v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 18, 225 N.E.2d 241 (1967); Kasari v. Industrial
Comm'n, 125 Ohio St. 410, 181 N.E. 809 (1932).
119. 10 Ohio St. 2d 18, 225 N.E.2d 241 (1967).
120. Id.; see also Bussell v. Mattin, 3 Ohio App. 3d 339. 445 N.E.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1981), based on similar facts.
121. Marlow v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 18, 22-23. 225 N.E.2d 241, 244-45 (1967).
122. 125 Ohio St. 410, 181 N.E. 809 (1932).
123. Id. at 410, 181 N.E. at 809.
124. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 390, 453 N.E.2d 570. 572 (1983).
125. 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194 (1932).
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Locher's fear that a "slip in the bathtub" will someday be considered "in the course
of employment" evidences the need for some clear guidelines.
Three Ohio cases involving zone of employment injuries provide some param-
eters for off-premises accidents. In Baughman v. Eaton Corp.,126 the court, in a per
curiam opinion, found that an employee injured while crossing a public street
separating the employer's parking lot and the employer's premises was acting in the
course of his employment. 127 The brevity of the court's analysis is striking. The court
gave only a cursory statement that it would be "unreasonable" to deny compensation
but failed to provide any explanation for its conclusion. '28 However, Baughman may
be distinguished from Littlefield because in Baughman, the plaintiff had reached the
employer's parking lot, and thus, had reached his zone of employment. 29
In Bralley v. Daugherty, 30 the employee, Bralley, while driving to work, was
injured in an accident at the crossing of a railroad siding and a private road that was
maintained and owned by an industrial park developer. The accident occurred
approximately one-third mile from the employer's facility. 13 1 The court denied
Bralley compensation and emphasized the long distance between the location of the
accident and the employer's facility as the reason for its decision. In Industrial
Commission v. Henry132 the accident that injured the employee occurred immediately
adjacent to the employer's premises and thus compensation was justified. 33
Justice Brown concurred in Littlefield and emphasized the difference between an
accident occurring immediately adjacent to the employer's premises, and one occur-
ring one-third mile from the employer's premises. 134 The employee in Bralley
encountered a special risk since she had to traverse a railroad crossing on her way to
work each day. 135 Simplifying the outcome in Bralley, it can be argued that accidents
that occur one-third mile from the employer's premises are beyond the reach of the
special hazard exception.
Finally, the Littlefield majority relied on a factual similarity with Industrial
Commission v. Henry, 136 a fifty year-old decision that granted compensation for an
off-premises injury. The employee, Henry, arrived at his place of employment early
in the morning and left shortly thereafter to eat breakfast at a nearby restaurant. 37
Upon returning to his employer's plant, Henry was struck and killed by a train that
was crossing the street immediately adjacent to the premises. 138 In Henry, as in
Littlefield, the court found that the existence of a hazard immediately adjacent to the
126. 62 Ohio St. 2d 62, 402 N.E.2d 1201 (1980).
127. Id. at 62-63, 402 N.E.2d at 1202.
128. Id. at 63, 402 N.E.2d at 1202.
129. Id.; see also Blair v. Daugherty, 60 Ohio App. 2d 165, 396 N.E.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1978).
130. 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 401 N.E.2d 448 (1980).
131. Id. at 302, 401 N.E.2d at 449.
132. 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194 (1932).
133. Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 306, 401 N.E.2d 448, 450 (1980); see also Spellman v. Industrial
Comm'n, 73 Ohio App. 369, 51 N.E.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1943).
134. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 395-96, 453 N.E.2d 570, 576 (1983) (Brown, J.. concurring).
135. Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 302, 401 N.E.2d 448, 449 (1980).
136. 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194 (1932).




sole means of ingress and egress to the employer's facility fulfilled the necessary
connection with work; 139 Henry, like Littlefield, could not enter the premises without
encountering the hazard. 140
In terms of the proximity of the accident to the employer's premises, Littlefield
appears to be a modem restatement of the Henry rationale. In both cases the accident
occurred immediately adjacent to the sole means of ingress and egress. The court's
emphasis on a sole means of ingress and egress to the employer's facility implies that
if Littlefield could have avoided the risk of this particular left turn by traveling to
another entrance, the outcome would be less clear. Examining the number of
entrances to the employer's premises introduces an element of fault into the liability
analysis. A worker could be precluded from recovering compensation if he were
negligent in encountering an unnecessary risk. 141 Yet fault is not relevant in workers'
compensation cases. 142 An employment hazard should not be treated as a lesser risk
than one common to the public in general if the special risk exception would otherwise
be met.
Two California cases, discussed by the Littlefield court, aid in defining the
parameters of the proximity factor. In General Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compen-
sation Appeals Board,143 the California Supreme Court refused to find a work
connection in a fact pattern analogous to Littlefield and Henry. In General Insurance,
the employee, Chairez, had been hit and killed by a passing car after parking his own
car on the street in front of his employer's premises. 144 The court distinguished the
left-hand turn cases of Greydanus145 and Pacific Indemnity.146 In those cases, the
employees were injured while turning left from a highway onto the employer's
premises. 147 The General Insurance court held that the type of risk the worker faced
in General Insurance was different than in the left-hand turn cases: turning left off a
busy highway is a distinct risk from opening a car door on a busy highway. 148 The
distinction, however, seems artificial. Both risks are encountered in areas immedi-
ately adjacent to the employer's premises. Chairez could have parked and been struck
on any street, and Littlefield probably made several left-hand turns on his way to and
from work. Chairez's accident occurred even closer to his employment than the
teacher's accident in Parks v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,149 which
139. Id. at 621-22, 180 N.E. at 196.
140. Id.
141. See Collier v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 90 Ohio App. 181, 104 N.E.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1950).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 10-Il, 34-37.
143. 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
144. Id.
145. Greydanus v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 490, 407 P.2d 296, 47 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1965).
146. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170 P.2d 18 (1946).
147. General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 600-01, 546 P.2d 1361, 1364, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 417, 420 (1976).
148. Id.
149. 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
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occurred "one or two car lengths on a public street from the school where she
taught." 150
Certainly the proximity of the accident to the employer's premises is one of the
most important facts to be considered in determining whether an injury was received
in the course of employment. 151 Hence, the greater the distance between the accident
site and the employer's premises, the more attenuated the connection between the
employment and the accident becomes. It is equally clear that the premises line is no
longer the line of demarcation between work-related and personal injuries. Bralley
and Henry appear to involve the same risk, a railroad crossing. The only meaningful
distinction between the two cases is the difference between twenty-five or thirty feet
from the employer's property and one-third mile from the employer's property.' 52 An
accident occurring one-third mile or farther from the employer's premises will be
noncompensable if the facts other than distance are identical to Henry or Littlefield.
2. The Employer's Control Over the Location of the Accident
Focusing on the degree of control exerted by the employer over the physical
location of the accident is justified to determine whether an injury occurred in the
course of employment.' 53 The more control an employer exerts over an area, the
greater the relationship between the hazard and the employment. If the employer can
control the area in which the injury-causing accident occurred, the employer can
eliminate the hazard and thereby reduce his costs. 154 An injury is not work connected
in cases when the employer had no power to prevent the accident. To find otherwise
would undermine the basic axioms of workers' compensation; the employer cannot
control or eliminate the risk and thus, the cost of injuries caused by the risk should
not be added to the cost of the product and borne by the general public. 155
The Littlefield court did not discuss Pillsbury's control over the location of the
accident. Employer control need not be confined to its physical premises. An
employer can control areas that extend beyond the employer's premises. 156 Pillsbury
did not own the public highway on which Littlefield was injured, but the company
could have cooperated with government authorities to provide an alternative, less
dangerous means of entrance to its facilities. In contrast, Pillsbury could not have
controlled intersections that were not "immediately adjacent" 157 to the plant. The
extent to which the employer can actually control or at least affect the location of the
150. Parks v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 585, 587, 660 P.2d 382, 383, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158, 159
(1983); see also Lefebvre v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 106 Cal. App. 3d 745, 165 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Ct. App.
1980)(injury occurring within 100 feet of premises held compensable); Mission Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.,
84 Cal. App. 3d 50. 148 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Ct. App. 1978)(one and one-half miles from employer's premises too far).
151. "As might be expected of a rule that is sometimes called the 'proximity' or 'threshold' rule, the sheer distance
of the special hazard from the premises may be an important factor in blocking application of the rule." I A. LARSON.
supra note 2. § 15.13.
152. Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 302, 401 N.E.2d 448, 449 (1980); Industrial Comm'n v. Henry,
124 Ohio St. 616, 618, 180 N.E. 194, 195 (1932).
153. Lord v. Daugherty, 66 Ohio St. 2d 441, 423 N.E.2d 96 (1981).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 207-10.
155. See supra text accompanying note 9.
156. J. YOUNG, supra note 7, § 5.6.
157. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 390, 453 N.E.2d 570, 572 (1983).
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accident should weigh heavily in the inquiry into whether an injury is work-con-
nected. If an employer can control an area, either directly or indirectly, injuries that
result from accidents that occur in the area should be deemed to be related in some
manner to the employment. Accordingly, compensating the injury can be justified. 58
In Industrial Commission v. Barber, 59 the employee was injured on a public
street that was maintained by his employer. The street led only to the employer's
facility.160 The Ohio Supreme Court found that the employer controlled the road and
thus determined that the employee's injury was sufficiently work-connected to
warrant the award of workers' compensation. Unlike the premises theory, it is not
necessary that the employer own the specific piece of property in order to find that
the employer "controls" the area. Rather, if the employer can exercise any influence
to decrease the dangers of an area, the employer might have sufficient control for a
court to find an injury that occurs within the area to be work-related. ' 6' Even though
the employer in Barber did not "own" the street on which the employee was injured,
the employer could have exercised control over it162 by persuading and lobbying civic
authorities to eliminate its hazards. Hence, because the employer indirectly controlled
the street, the employee's injury was work-related. 163
In comparison, the worker in Bralley v. Daugherty 64 was injured while traveling
on a private road that was owned and maintained by the developer of the industrial
park where the employer did business. Admittedly, the employer in Barber had
maintained the public street on which the accident occurred, 65 whereas the employer
in Bralley did nothing to the street on which Bralley was injured.' 66 However, the
inquiry into whether the employer controlled the location of the accident should
extend beyond an examination of the physical contacts or ownership of the site, 167 to
an examination of the employer's power to control the risk. Certainly the employer
in Bralley had more power to eliminate or reduce the risk presented by the railroad
siding on the developer's private road than Pillsbury had to reduce the risk of turning
left into the employer's premises from the public highway. Bralley's employer
conducted business with the developer and could have persuaded it to install warning
devices at the railroad crossing. It would have been much more difficult for Pillsbury
158. J. YOUNG, supra note 7, § 5.6.
159. 117 Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363 (1927).
160. Id. at 374-75, 159 N.E. at 363.
161. For an illustration of a strict application of the control test, see Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
54 Ohio App. 2d 186, 376 N.E.2d 961 (Ct. App. 1977), impliedly overruled by Baughman v. Eaton Corp., 62 Ohio St.
2d 62, 402 N.E.2d 1201 (1980).
162. Industrial Comm'n v. Barber, 117 Ohio St. 373, 374-75, 159 N.E. 363, 363 (1927).
163. Id.
164. 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 302, 401 N.E.2d 448, 449 (1980).
165. Industrial Comm'n v. Barber, 117 Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363 (1927).
166. Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 302, 401 N.E.2d 448, 449 (1980).
167. The court in Bralley restricted its inquiry to physical contacts with the road, including responsibility for
maintenance, construction, repair, patrol, marking, or inspection," acknowledging that the employer exercises some
element of control over the road through a non-exclusive easement. Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 302, 401
N.E.2d 448, 449 (1980). In contrast, the court of appeals in Friskhorn v. Flowers, 26 Ohio App. 2d 165, 270 N.E.2d
366 (Ct. App. 1971) took an expansive view of employer control in awarding compensation to an employee injured in
a shopping center parking lot. The employer had rental rights and privileges to use the parking lot. The court found this
was enough to constitute control.
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to persuade the state to build a separate left turn lane and install a left turn light in front
of its plant.
In Industrial Commission v. Henry, t68 the employer had no direct control over
the area in front of the plant entrance in which the railroad crossing and the public
street intersected, but the employer did have the power to relocate the entrance to a
less hazardous place. 169 In Littlefield, Pillsbury also could have moved its plant
entrance to a less hazardous intersection. Although at first glance, this degree of
control may appear attenuated, local governments, eager to cultivate business devel-
opment in today's economy, can accommodate the special needs and concerns of
employers.
Accidents arising from hazards at or near plant entrances are the clearest cases
in which a court can find employer control over the accident. If the employer locates
an entrance at a dangerous intersection, the employer can be held accountable for
employee accidents which occur when the employee enters or leaves the premises,
even accidents that occur off the employer's premises. An examination of the
employer's control over the location of the accident is justified when the employer has
an economic incentive to reduce or minimize the risk associated with the location of
the accident site; this incentive is direct for a self-insured employer, who will
potentially pay higher awards, and indirect for employers who contribute to the state
fund, because the employer's premium may increase. 170 Employer control should be
examined more expansively. Courts should look beyond ownership of the property on
which the accident occurred and ascertain the employer's ability to control the risk.
This entails an examination into what the employer could do or could have done to
eliminate the risk, not what the employer has done in the past.
3. Instrumentality or Person Physically Affecting the Accident
If a person or instrumentality related to the injured employee's employment
physically affected an accident, compensation may be awarded; this factor is derived
from the "arising out of the employment" requirement for compensation.' 7 ' While
usually not at issue in going and coming rule cases, this factor provides some insight
into a work connection inquiry. The Littlefield majority entirely overlooked the grain
truck that struck the car in which Littlefield was riding. Because Pillsbury uses grain
in its flour business, the truck could have been approaching the plant to make a
168. 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194 (1932).
169. Id.
170. This same analysis applies to General Ins. Co. v. workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d
1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976), because the employer in General Insurance could have eliminated the risk encountered
when parking alongside the street by providing a parking lot for its employees. Id. at 598, 546 P.2d at 1362, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 418. In considering the frequency of exposure to a common risk and the degree of control exerted by the employer
over the accident scene, General Insurance is quite similar to Littlefield and Parks v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 33
Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983); nevertheless, the California Supreme Court refused to find the
injury work-related. General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 601, 546 P.2d 1361. 1364, 128
Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1976). For a criticism of General Insurance, see Prendergast, Going and Coming Rule Literally
Applied-Special Risk and Special Mission Exceptions Narrowly Construed, 17 SANTA Ct.ARA L. REV. 726 (1977).
171. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page Supp. 1983); IA A. LARSON, supra note 2. § 29.10; Malone, supra
note 31; see supra text accompanying notes 18-31.
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delivery when the accident occurred. Thus, the volume of traffic around the plant in
part was attributable to Pillsbury's business activity.' 7 2
In Parks v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 73 traffic had stopped to
allow children leaving the school to cross the street; Parks and other departing
teachers who were waiting in their parked cars were thereby susceptible to assault. ' 74
The school could have syncopated the release of the schoolchildren to avoid traffic
tie-ups on the public street or policed the street crossing to minimize the chance that
teachers could be robbed while traffic was stopped. Sitting in a stopped car was a
special risk that Parks frequently encountered; consequently, a work connection
existed. 175
Nelson v. City of St. Paul76 is analogous to Parks. In Nelson, a teacher, while
walking along a public sidewalk, was struck by a ball that had been hit by a student. 77
Compensation was awarded to the teacher; the source of the injury, the student-hit
ball, came from the employment premises, the schoolgrounds.t 78 Even though the
risk extended off the premises and any pedestrian was subject to it, a teacher incurs
a greater risk than other people because a teacher repeatedly faces this common
risk.' 79 Because the injury directly resulted from an act committed by a person
connected with the teacher's employment, the Nelson court easily reasoned that the
teacher could collect compensation.
In Marlow v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,'80 an employee was injured in an
automobile accident that occurred in the employer's parking lot. ' 8' The court awarded
compensation and based its decision on the zone of employment theory.' 82 In
Marlow, however, the argument that the injury was work-related is even stronger
because the plaintiff-employee's car was struck by another employee's car rather than
by a nonemployee's car.' 83
In Oliver v. Wyandotte Industries Corp., 84 a case cited by the Littlefield
majority opinion, an employee who was leaving the employer's private road and
turning onto a public highway was struck by a passing car. The court held that the
employee's injuries were compensable; a snowbank created by the employer had
obstructed her vision. ' 85 The snowbank which was created by the employer was the
172. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389,389-90,453 N.E.2d 570, 571-72 (1983). Some scholars suggest
weighing elements of both "in the course of" and "arising out of" to arrive at a determination of work-relatedness. The
truck which struck the car in which Littlefield was riding was not actually traveling to the Pillsbury plant. However,
Pillsbury's plant and several other grain-related businesses are located in the same vicinity. Traffic problems on the
highway are related to this business activity. Telephone interview with David Levine of Clark & Eyrich Co. (Mar. 1985).
173. 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983).
174. Id. at 587, 660 P.2d at 383, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
175. Id.
176. 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957).
177. Id. at 55, 81 N.W.2d at 275.
178. Id. at 57-59. 81 N.W.2d at 276-77.
179. Id. at 58, 81 N.W.2d at 277. Contra. Quarant v. Industrial Comm'n, 38 I11. 2d 490, 231 N.E.2d 397 (1967).
180. 10 Ohio St. 2d 18, 225 N.E.2d 241 (1967).
181. Id. at 18-19, 225 N.E.2d at 242.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
183. Marlow v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 18, 18-19, 225 N.E.2d 241, 242 (1967).
184. 308 A.2d 860 (Me. 1973).
185. Id.
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employment hazard, and it extended beyond the employer's boundary line.
The physical cause of an accident, however, may not be related to the employ-
ment; this weighs against work connection. In General Insurance Co. v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board,186 by comparison, the employee was killed by a
passing car while parking his own vehicle on the street in front of his employer's
premises.' 87 The employer in General Insurance did not control the traffic on the
street, and there was no indication that the traffic was related to the employer's
business. 188 In Littlefield, the court did not consider the employer's control over the
instrumentality that caused the accident (the grain truck). It seems evident, however,
that the existence of an employment-related person or instrumentality that affects the
accident is an important factor and should weigh heavily in finding that the resulting
injury is work-connected and in awarding compensation. ' 89
4. The Benefit to the Employer of the Employee's Activity at the Time of the
Accident
The going and coming rule should not preclude recovery in all off-premises
lunch break cases. The benefit the employer receives from the employee's activity at
the time of the accident should be examined to determine whether the employee
should be awarded compensation. In Littlefield, the employee had worked through a
paid fifteen minute break. He added this time to his unpaid thirty minute lunch
break. 190 The Littlefield court argued that Littlefield's lunch break and forty-five
minute sojourn contributed to his productivity; Littlefield only exited the plant
premises because of his extended lunch time and only had extra time because he had
worked through his paid break. Thus, the employer received a benefit from
Littelfield's lengthened lunch;' 9 ' hence the lunch break was work-related. 192
The Littlefield court analogized the facts of the case before it to those in
Industrial Commission v. Henry. 193 Henry had only been at work a short time before
he left to eat breakfast. In contrast, Littlefield had worked several hours before taking
his break. The court thus reasoned that Littlefield's break contributed more to his
productivity than Henry's break contributed to Henry's effectiveness. 194 The produc-
tivity argument, however, suffers serious flaws. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Hornyak v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 95 distinguished between lunchtime
trips and homeward trips. The Hornyak court believed that the employee's obligation
to return to work and the benefit to the employer from the employee taking a lunch
break justified a finding of work-connection for off-premises lunch break injuries. 196
186. 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
187. Id. at 598, 546 P.2d at 1362, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
188. Id.; see also Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 401 N.E.2d 448 (1980).
189. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38 (1921).
190. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 389, 453 N.E. 2d 570, 571-72 (1983).
191. Id. at 394-95, 453 N.E.2d 575-76.
192. Id.
193. 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194 (1932).
194. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 394-95, 453 N.E.2d 570, 575-76 (1983).
195. 63 N.J. 99, 305 A.2d 65 (1973).
196. Id. at 107-08, 305 A.2d at 69-70.
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In his text on workers' compensation, Professor Larson criticizes the Hornyak
decision, stating that the employee is no more obligated to return to work from lunch
than he is to report to work at the start of each workday. 197 Additionally, Professor
Larson argues that the employer receives no more productivity benefits from a worker
who goes to lunch than from a worker who goes home each night: "An employee
could conceivably finish his workday without lunch, but he would be an inefficient
employee, indeed, if he missed his dinner, his night's sleep, and his breakfast.' 98
Justice Locher criticized the Littlefield majority's productivity argument and
argued that the break in Henry increased the employee's productivity more than the
break in Littlefield increased Littlefield's productivity. 199 Both the majority opinion
and the dissenting opinion miss the point. The productivity argument is irrelevant in
distinguishing lunch travel from going and coming home. The employer receives no
greater productivity benefits from the employee who travels to lunch than from the
employee who travels to and from work each day.
In County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,200 a case
decided subsequent to Parks v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,20' a Cali-
fornia court of appeals denied compensation to an employee who had been injured
during her lunch hour. A car crashed into the food stand where she was eating,
causing her to suffer multiple injuries. 202 Her one hour lunch break was, like
Littlefield's, comprised of paid breaks, of fifteen minutes each, and an unpaid thirty
minute lunch break. The court refused to consider any part of the lunch period as paid
time, 203 and thus foreclosed the conclusion that the lunch period was necessary for the
employee's comfort and convenience: 2° 4 "We do not believe the requirement that an
injury occur in the 'course of employment' is met where the employer's only
connection to the injury is to allow an employee to rearrange her work time and
off-duty time for the employee's convenience or benefit.' '205 Thus, the partially paid
lunch break would not justify application of the special risk exception. Because Ohio
has adopted the California special risk exception and because California plays a
leading role in developing the law of workers' compensation, Ohio should adopt the
rule espoused by the court in County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board.
197. 1 A. LARsoN, supra note 2, § 15.12.
198. Id.
199. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 402-03, 453 N.E.2d 570, 581-82 (1983) (Locher, J.,
dissenting).
200. 145 Cal. App. 3d 418, 193 Cal. Rptr. 374 (Ct. App. 1983).
201. 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983).
202. County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 145 Cal. App. 3d 418,420, 193 Cal. Rptr. 374. 375
(Ct. App. 1983).
203. Id. at 422-23, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 376. Butsee Duncan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 150 Cal. App. 3d 117,
197 Cal. Rptr. 474 (Ct. App. 1983)(compensation of salaried employee apportioned over the workday, including her lunch
period, because of the employer's acquiescence in her practice of working through three daily break periods).
204. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 17, § 9.03[2][a].
205. County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 145 Cal. App. 3d 418, 423, 193 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376
(Ct. App. 1983).
1985]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
C. The Direction of the Special Risk Exception
All four of the previously discussed factual categories: the proximity of the
accident to the employer's premises, the employer's control over the location of the
accident, the instrumentality or person from the employment affecting the accident,
and the benefit to the employer of the employee's activity at the time of the accident,
are interrelated and must be balanced to determine whether the special risk exception
applies to a set of facts. While one circumstance may militate against a finding of
work connection, another may favor it.206 All the facts and circumstances must be
carefully weighed before the special risk exception to the going and coming rule can
be applied. If after considering all the factors in the case a court concludes that the
injury was work-related, workers' compensation should be awarded to the injured
employee.
V. STATUTORY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Littlefield majority noticeably failed to discuss relevant statutes and public
policies which support its position. The policies which underlie the workers' com-
pensation system are crucial to the outcome of most cases. An examination of the
Ohio General Assembly's goals to be accomplished by workers' compensation is thus
necessary.207
Workers' compensation seeks to provide benefits to victims of work-related
injuries without reference to fault and seeks to allocate the cost of the award system
to the consumer. In this manner, the "cost of the product... bear[s] the blood of the
workman.' '208 By passing the cost of the injury, or rather the cost of insuring against
injuries, to the consumer, the product's true cost is reflected in its price. To reduce
costs and thereby remain competitive, an employer will try to reduce insurance
premium increases or, in the case of a self-insurer, to reduce the number of
compensation claims. In order to reduce these burdensome sums, an employer will try
to eliminate, to the extent such efforts are cost-efficient, 20 9 the employment hazards
that directly or indirectly result in increased premiums and claims. If the connection
between the employment and the injury is so tenuous that the employer cannot affect
or change the causal factor, the policy of including the cost of injuries in the cost of
the product is undercut. In addition, the consumer should not pay for compensating
injuries that are not connected to work and thus not a cost of producing the product.
Hence, requiring an injury to be work-related serves a very real purpose in effectu-
ating the goals of the workers' compensation system.
206. For example, a worker may be injured in an automobile accident fifty feet farther from his employer's premises
than Littlefield was, but he may have been hit by one of his employer's trucks driving through the intersection of a public
and private street. In this case, the latter circumstance counterbalances the longer distance from the premises and the
requisite work connection may exist.
207. The Ohio General Assembly is considering a bill that would effectively reverse the Littlefield result. See H.B.
No. 423, 116th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1985-86).
208. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3, § 80, at 573.
209. An employer may receive points or penalties, depending on whether his record of accidents for particularjob
classifications is above or below the actuarial average for the industry. These points or penalties serve to reduce or increase
an employer's premiums. Thus, an employer has a direct and tangible incentive to eliminate risks he controls.
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If the employer's connection and control over preventing an injury is so remote
that it cannot alter the situation, the injured worker should bear the cost of the injury.
Historically, courts believed this was harsh, because an individual employee rarely
insured himself or his family from the debilitating cost of accidents. In transportation
cases today, by contrast, nearly all drivers carry some form of automobile insurance
which protects them and others against calamitous medical costs. Indeed, since 1984,
Ohio law requires all licensed Ohio drivers to purchase motor vehicle operation
insurance coverage or to be financially responsible.2 10 Perhaps this consideration will
pacify those who believe that workers' compensation is harsh to employees whose
injuries are not deemed to be work-related.
The Ohio General Assembly has provided that the workers' compensation laws
should be liberally construed in favor of workers. 2"l The Littlefield majority relied on
this provision to justify its conclusions. 212 The court stated, "We are mindful that [the
Workers' Compensation Act must] be liberally construed in favor of employees. ' 2 1 3
This section is merely a legislative restatement of a judicial rule that originated with
the advent of compensation law. 21 4 Courts, therefore, must not read the liberal
construction statute as an added legislative mandate but only as an agreement by the
legislature with the current judicial path. "Liberal construction has its limita-
tions. . . .The real import of the liberal construction rule is that the employee is to
receive the prime benefit when an element of discretion is present in an administrative
or judicial determination." 2 1 5 The limits of the rule have long been recognized by
courts: "The Workmens' Compensation Law is construed liberally and with a view
to accomplishing the purpose of its enactment, but an award is not authorized unless
there be some evidence to support the claim of liability." 2 1 6
Another Ohio statute, passed in 1982 and not discussed by either the majority or
dissent, excludes compensation for injuries resulting from "participating in a rid-
esharing arrangement between [an employee's] place of residence and place of
employment or termini near such places." 21 7 A ridesharing arrangement is defined as
"the transportation of persons in a motor vehicle where such transportation is
incidental to another purpose of a volunteer driver .... ",218 While it appears that the
statute was intended to encourage car pooling the statute may indicate the legislature's
general attitude toward compensating off-premises injuries. If the general assembly
sought to preclude compensation for injuries resulting from an accident in an
employer-organized carpool, how much more attenuated to the employment is an
automobile accident occurring on the way to work by an employee driving himself?
210. Ono Rev. CODE ANN. § 4509.101 (Baldwin 1983). Littlefield recovered a $5,025,000 judgment in a separate
action against the employer of the driver who hit the car in which he was a passenger. However, Littlefield settled for less
when the employer filed bankruptcy. Telephone Interview with David Levine (Mar. 1985).
211. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Page 1980).
212. Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 395, 453 N.E.2d 570, 576 (1983).
213. Id.
214. J. YOUNG, supra note 7, § 4.9.
215. Id.
216. Industrial Comm'n v. Lewis, 125 Ohio St. 296, 300, 181 N.E. 136, 137-38 (1932).
217. Otio REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.452 (Page Supp. 1983).
218. Id.
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The legislature intended that automobile accidents involving employer-arranged
carpools are not work-connected accidents. A non-carpool automobile accident that
occurs on the way to work is even further removed from work connection, since the
employee's transportation in this case is even less related to his work.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Littlefield court limited its holding to the facts of the case. Courts and review
boards should not view Littlefield as a license to grant compensation in all off-
premises accidents; it is only authority to grant compensation in cases when the facts
and circumstances warrant a finding of work-connection. 2 9 Thus limited, Littlefield
effects a just result when an employment hazard, not simply a hazard associated with
the common risk of traveling to and from work, causes an off-premises injury.
Merely reformulating the language of the special risk exception will not solve the
problem, for the failure of this test to address important factors, such as proximity of
the accident to the employer's premises, leaves no logical end to its satisfaction. If
the risk of the left turn Littlefield made was increased because of his increased
frequency of exposure to it, the same holds true for every left turn made by him on
his regular route to work each day. To comply with the Ohio Constitution and
statutory law, 220 there must be limits on the application of the special risk exception.
Indeed, the inconsistency of application of the exception to California cases22'
forewarns that a literalist approach is not desired.
Instead, when confronted with a going to and from work case like Littlefield,
courts should examine all the facts and circumstances bearing on the basic issues of
causal connection and work connection. Particular weight should be given to the
proximity of the accident to the employer's premises. By weighing these factors in an
individual case as they compare with previous cases, a result can be achieved that is
neither unduly harsh from an injured employee's viewpoint nor unduly expansive
from an employer's viewpoint.
Mark Alan Johnson
219. See Huffman v. Bureau of Workers' Comp., Case No. CA-6220 (Stark County Ct. App. Nov. 28, 1983). where
the court reversed summary judgment and remanded the case based on Littlefleld with no discussion of the facts of the
case.
220. See supra note 18.
221. Compare General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361. 128 Cal. Rptr.
417 (1976) with Parks v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983).
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